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THE SECURITIES ACT AT ITS DIAMOND JUBILEE:  
RENEWING THE CASE FOR A ROBUST 
REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT 
Daniel J. Morrissey*  
 “Yes, there are weapons of mass destruction.  They are ‘financial 
weapons of mass destruction’ . . . .” 
 — Warren Buffett1 
 
 “I keep hearing well-meaning people say that America is not a 
nation if it doesn’t have control over its borders.  But are we a nation if 
there is no meaningful restraint on what people can do with an offering 
statement . . . ?” 
— Ben Stein2 
 
I. INTRODUCTION:  TURMOIL AND DISTRUST IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS 
Midway through 2008, the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Securities 
Act of 1933,3 America’s capital markets were again reeling from the type 
of economic turmoil4 which that landmark legislation was supposed to 
* Professor and Former Dean, Gonzaga University Law School.  A.B. 1971, 
Georgetown University, J.D. 1974 Georgetown University.  This article is dedicated to the 
author’s dear friend, Pat Rubinstein.  The author would also like to thank student assistant 
Jefferson Boswell for his very helpful work in preparing this article for publication. 
 1. Buffett made these remarks describing securities backed by subprime mortgages 
and the havoc they have wrought on the credit markets.  Mortimer B. Zuckerman, The 
Credit Crisis Grows, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Dec. 24, 2007, at 68 (quoting Warren 
Buffett). 
 2. Ben Stein, Tattered Standard of Duty on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2007, at 
BU6. 
 3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77z (2000 & Supp. IV 2005). 
 4. As a New York Times article recently reported: 
Ever since Wall Street bankers were called back from their vacations last 
summer to deal with the convulsions in the mortgage market, the economy has 
been lurching from one crisis to the next.  The International Monetary Fund has 
described the situations as ‘the largest financial shock since the Great 
Depression.’   
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prevent.  This time the chaos was caused by the collapse of debt obligations 
collateralized by sub-prime mortgages, a $12 trillion dollar industry 
engineered by the leading investment banks of Wall Street.5  These so-
David Leonhardt, Obamanomics, N.Y. TIMES SUN. MAG., Aug. 24, 2008, at 30.  
In a speech in London on July 2, 2008 Treasury Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. “predicted 
that turmoil in the financial markets and a slowdown in economic growth” would continue 
for some time.  Julia Werdigier, Paulson Calls for Stronger Regulators, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 
2008, at C2. 
Likewise Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke predicted in a speech on July 8, 2008, 
that the problems plaguing the housing and capital markets would continue well into 2009.  
Stephen Labaton, Fed Concludes Economic Woes Likely to Spill into 2009, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB., July 9, 2008, at A1. 
When the major investment banking firm Bear Stearns collapsed in March, 2008, a financial 
reporter made this grim observation, “Fifteen thousand jobs lost in the financial sector since 
the fall.  Recession.  Panic on Wall Street.  Crisis in the housing market.  Bear Stearns sold 
at $2 a share.”  Cate Doty, Where Wall Street’s Caviar Set Still Thrives, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
24, 2008, at C1. 
The Bear Stearns debacle itself would cost another 14,000 employees their jobs.  Kate 
Kelly, The Fall of Bear Stearns:  Lost Opportunities Haunt Final Days of Bear Stearns, 
WALL ST. J., May 27, 2008, at A1. 
According to a more recent report, 83,000 employees of New York investment firms have 
lost their jobs as of mid-year 2008 while those companies have been “racking up billions of 
dollars in losses as a result of their foolish forays into subprime mortgages.”  Andrew Ross 
Sorkin, A ‘Bonfire’ Returns as Heartburn, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2008, at C5.  According to 
the N.Y. Times, the ensuing housing bust has “metastasized into the worst financial crisis 
since the Depression.”  Editorial, About Those Loans, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2008. 
A further sign that the economic crisis continued to worsen was the precipitous fall in the 
shares of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and The Federal Home 
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), two federally-chartered companies that are the 
nation’s largest buyers of home mortgages.  James R. Hagerty, Deborah Solomon & Damian 
Paletta, U.S. Mulls Future of Fannie, Freddie, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2008, at A1. 
Many commentators predicted that the problems with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would 
ultimately fall upon the taxpayers.  As one commentator noted, “Washington today has its 
fingerprints on 80% of new mortgages, up from 40% a year ago[.]”  Holman W. Jenkins, Jr., 
More Bailouts, Please!, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2008, at A13.  The U.S. Treasury Department 
has finally announced plans to take control of the companies and provide up to $200 billion 
in capital to them.  James R. Hagerty, Ruth Simon & Damian Paletta, U.S. Seizes Mortgage 
Giants, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2008, at A1. 
After allowing Lehman Brothers to file for bankruptcy, but rescuing the insurance giant 
AIG, the U.S. Treasury eventually gave up its piecemeal approach to this financial crisis.  It 
persuaded Congress to authorize a $700 billion appropriation to rescue the entire financial 
system.  Greg Hitt & Deborah Solomon, Historic Bailout Passes as Economy Slips Further, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 4-5, 2008, at A1. 
 5. For a well-researched and well-written exposé of how once-reputable financial 
houses like Merrill Lynch and Bear Stearns created this investing travesty, see PAUL MUOLO 
& MATHEW PADILLA, CHAIN OF BLAME:  HOW WALL STREET CAUSED THE MORTGAGE AND 
CREDIT CRISIS (John Wiley & Sons 2008). 
Another well-received, recent book describing the causes of the sub-prime mortgage debacle 
is MARK ZANDI, FINANCIAL SHOCK:  A 360° LOOK AT THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE IMPLOSION, 
AND HOW TO AVOID THE NEXT FINANCIAL CRISIS (FT Press 2008). 
See also James Surowiecki, The Financial Page, Too Dumb to Fail, THE NEW YORKER, 
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called “securitized assets” were contracts that promised their purchasers 
profit from the efforts of others.6  As such, they were just the type of 
passive investments whose holders would need the complete and accurate 
information that federal registration was designed to provide.7 
Mar. 31, 2008, at 46 (noting that most of the money loaned today no longer comes from 
commercial banks but from these debt obligations that are packaged and sold by investment 
banks as securities). 
A leading European journal has offered this perspective: 
[a]s markets that were crucial for raising funds started to dry up last August 
[2007], a network of financial vehicles slid into crisis, causing the price of many 
debt securities to collapse.  That started a chain reaction that created liquidity 
and solvency crises at U.S. and European banks—on a scale last seen in Japan 
almost exactly a decade ago . . . . 
. . . A year later, there is still no sign of an end to these problems.  Instead, the 
sense of pressure on western banks has risen so high that by some measures this 
is now the worst financial crisis seen in the west for 70 years. 
Gillian Tett, A Year that Shook Faith in Finance, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2008, at 11. 
Another commentator on the international scene, however, is more sanguine: 
Of course, low interest rates and cheap credit also cause people to act foolishly 
or greedily, inflating bubbles in technology stocks, housing, subprime 
mortgages, or emerging market equities—bubbles that eventually pop.  As the 
world gets more interconnected, and financial instruments more exotic, many 
observers worry that the virtuous cycle of growth and confidence could turn into 
a vicious one of panic and depression.  But, so far, even as the unwinding of 
crises is extremely painful, the diverse new sources of growth and massive 
quantities of new capital have given the global economic system as a whole 
greater resilience.” 
FAREED ZAKARIA, THE POST-AMERICAN WORLD 27 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2008). 
 6. “Securitization involves transferring a loan or pool of loans into a trust and then 
having that trust issue securities, or bonds, that are rated by the large rating agencies and 
purchased in the institutional bond market.”  Ethan Penner, The Future of Securitization, 
WALL ST. J., July 10, 2008, at A15. 
A study by the SEC has found that agencies that rate securities were complicit in deceiving 
purchasers about the true worth of those securities.  For instance, an analyst at one of the 
agencies wrote this in an email to a colleague about securities backed by subprime 
mortgages:  “Let’s hope we are all wealthy and retired by the time this house of cards 
falters.”  Michael M. Grynbaum, Study Finds Flawed Practices at Ratings Firms, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 9, 2008, at C1. 
However, the SEC itself contributed to the creation of this crisis by relaxing its net capital 
rules for large investment banks.  This allowed the brokerage units of those institutions to 
substantially increase the amount of debt they could assume.  Stephen Labaton, Agency’s 
’04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, and Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at A1. 
Such deception has compounded the market’s loss of confidence.  As David Einhorn, a 
hedge fund manager, recently put it, “This is sort of like a confessional where the priest 
delivers a public opinion on the extent of your virtues or sins, and your spouse has to guess 
what a AAA or a BBB means about your fidelity.”  Floyd Norris, A Debacle that has Wall 
Street in the Dark, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2007, at C1. 
 7. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.  Section 4(5) however was added to the 
Securities Act in 1975 to exempt one prominent securities asset, mortgaged-backed 
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This unstable situation8 involving the packaging and selling of 
participation in shaky real estate loans has exposed the vulnerability of 
investors.9  Not only was the risky nature of those securities hidden from 
their purchasers, but it may not have been known by their underwriters.10  
Such practices on Wall Street provoked this telling comment from novelist 
and social critic Tom Wolfe:  “Nobody understands where the actual value 
is - and they don’t care anymore.”11 
The subprime mortgage debacle has thus hit the American economy 
hard, wiping out billions of dollars in stock market value and resulting in 
huge losses to top financial institutions.12  As a leading economist put it, 
securities, from the Act’s  registration requirement. 
 8. This crisis, however, was only the latest in a string of securities scandals that have 
shaken the foundations of our economic system.  At the beginning of the decade, right after 
the bursting of the dot-com bubble, there was a spate of accounting frauds like Enron.  Then 
came news of widespread deceitful conduct by stock analysts along with abusive market 
timing and late trading by mutual fund managers.  More recent revelations about the 
pervasive practice of options backdating by already lushly-compensated corporate 
executives have further eroded public trust in those who manage our society’s economic 
resources.  For the author’s comments on these situations, see Daniel J. Morrissey, After the 
Ball Is Over:  Investor Remedies in the Wake of the Dot-Com Crash and Recent Corporate 
Scandals, 83 NEB. L. REV. 732 (2005) and Daniel J. Morrissey, The Path of Corporate Law:  
Of Options Backdating, Derivative Suits, and the Business Judgment Rule, 86 OR. L. REV. 
973 (2007). 
 9. A particularly poignant example are the losses suffered by the Indiana Children’s 
Wish Fund, a charity for children with life-threatening illness, that put $48,000 in a fund 
invested heavily in mortgage-backed securities without being told of the risks such 
investments posed.  Gretchen Morgenson, The Debt Crisis, Where It’s Least Expected, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 30, 2007, at BU1. 
On the other end of the spectrum, the sub-prime mortgage crisis has even caused housing 
prices to plummet in Greenwich, Connecticut, an exclusive suburb outside of New York 
City.  “[The crisis] has reverberated through the financial system, costing many [Greenwich] 
residents, actual or aspiring, their jobs or credit lines.”  Nick Paumgarten, A Greenwich of 
the Mind, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 25, 2008. 
Such consequences may be particularly appropriate, however, since Greenwich is also the 
home of so many hedge funds that it has been called, “Hedgeistan.”  See Cho, infra note 
181. 
 10. Such knowledge was not necessary because the investment banks took credit assets 
and transferred them into a trust which then sold interests in them to the bond market.  The 
investment banks made significant profits in this process and then walked away from any 
risk.  See Penner, supra note 6. 
Firms like Merrill Lynch, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers thus exposed their clients to 
immense losses.  Stein, supra note 2. 
 11. Sorkin, supra note 4.  As the author of Bonfire of the Vanities, a highly-acclaimed 
novel about a successful Wall Street bond trader in the mid-1980s, Wolfe has some 
expertise in chronicling the human follies that the capital markets can engender. 
 12. Morgenson, supra note 9.  As has been aptly described elsewhere, the Federal 
Reserve intervened during the St. Patrick’s Day weekend of 2008 to arrange a hasty sale of 
Bear Stearns to J.P. Morgan-Chase with a pledge of lending from the Central Bank to 
support the value of Bear’s securities.  See Kelly, supra note 4. 
Fed chairman Bernanke has announced that his board will continue this policy of supplying 
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“[h]ere you had all these people who were supposed to be sophisticated 
investors, and it turns out they were buying billions of dollars worth of debt 
where they didn’t understand what they owned.”13 
Policymakers who must deal with these troubling circumstances 
should remember the groundbreaking reform legislation enacted three 
quarters of a century ago when our country faced an even greater crisis of 
trust in its financial institutions.  In the depths of the Great Depression, the 
new administration of Franklin Delano Roosevelt secured passage of the 
Securities Act of 1933 as part of its fabled 100 Days of remedial 
lawmaking.14  Its principal provision, designed to protect investors from 
fraud and ensure confidence in our capital markets, mandates that securities 
be registered before they are offered and sold to the public.15  Over the 
years, however, the exemptions to that requirement have been broadened, 
allowing more and more securities to be issued without that important 
safeguard.16 
This Article will argue that the weakening of registration, which has 
occurred during the last twenty-five years of deregulatory fervor, should be 
reversed.  The current disarray in our financial system makes the need for 
such reform compelling.  In particular, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC or Commission), the federal agency charged with 
administration and enforcement of the Securities Act, should not go 
forward with its proposed rules to expand exemptions to the Act’s 
registration requirement.17  Rather, it should consider ways to protect 
registration safeguards in order to forestall further meltdown of our capital 
markets. 
In making this case, this Article will first discuss the nature and 
origins of securities registration.  It will then examine how registration has 
worked in practice during its seventy-five years of existence.  An analysis 
of the deregulatory reforms that have lessened such protection will be 
included in that discussion.18  These deregulatory reforms were enacted 
during the last quarter-century in response to charges that stringent 
registration requirements posed an undue burden to capital formation. 
An article on this topic, however, would not be complete without 
loans when necessary to large investment banks.  Damian Paletta & Sudeep Reddy, 
Bernanke Moves to Extend Powers as Credit Woes Linger, WALL ST. J., July 9, 2008, at A1.  
For a trenchant critique of this policy of using the Fed to shore up failing firms, see Jenkins, 
supra note 4. 
 13. Peter S. Goodman, The Free Market:  A False Idol After All?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 
2007, at WK 4. 
 14. See infra notes 30-39 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 100-39 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 216-43 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra notes 100-39 and accompanying text. 
  
754 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 11:3 
 
 
treatment of hedge funds and private equity companies, two vehicles for 
large pools of investment funds that have become prominent in recent 
years.  This Article will therefore examine whether they have changed the 
nature of capital formation and how that should affect registration.19  It will 
then directly address and critique the SEC’s latest proposals to further 
circumscribe the registration requirement.20  As recent events have shown, 
just the opposite response is now needed to protect investors from fraud 
and instill renewed public trust in the integrity of our financial markets. 
II. THE ORIGINS OF FEDERAL REGULATION OF SECURITIES 
A. Antecedents of Federal Legislation 
Although the law requiring the federal registration of securities was a 
major innovation on the national level when Congress passed the Securities 
Act in 1933, this legislation had ample precedent both in Great Britain and 
in the securities acts of our several states. 
English regulation of securities trading can be traced back to medieval 
statutes.  Securities regulation became prevalent in the 17th and 18th century 
to combat the panics and bubbles associated with the sale of securities by 
companies set up to colonize the New World.21  Then, as Great Britain led 
the way into the Industrial Revolution, Parliament passed a series of 
Companies Acts in the 19th century requiring the registration of 
prospectuses selling corporate shares and providing stringent liability for 
the directors and promoters of those companies if their offering documents 
were fraudulent.22 
In America, rapid industrialization began in earnest after the Civil 
War, with much of the capital contributed by middle class investors.  In 
that era of the notorious robber barons, calls for some type of national 
regulation of the sales of securities came after the panics of 1873 and 1907 
and the recessions that followed them.23  The first investor protection laws, 
 19. See infra notes 175-207 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 220-43 and accompanying text. 
 21. See generally LOUIS LOSS AND JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION 1-2 (Aspen Law & Business 2001) (explaining the origin of English securities 
regulation). 
 22. These laws developed gradually in Britain throughout the second half of the 19th 
century as Parliament experimented with various approaches that either mandated corporate 
disclosure or made disclosure voluntary.  Finally in 1900 the United Kingdom settled on 
making such practices mandatory for all types of registered companies.  Robert A. Prentice, 
The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 807 (2006). 
The Securities Act was modeled on the Companies Act of 1900.  James M. Landis, The 
Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29, 34 (1960). 
 23. See generally, JOHN STEELE GORDON, AN EMPIRE OF WEALTH:  THE EPIC HISTORY 
OF AMERICAN ECONOMIC POWER 223-28 (HarperCollins Pub. 2004) (explaining an incident 
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however, arose from the state legislatures.  They came particularly from 
those in the western region where shady eastern-based securities salesmen 
were raising capital from local residents.24  Kansas, then a stronghold of 
populist sentiment, led the way in 1911 with the first laws aimed at such 
promoters who were said to be so deceitful that they “would sell building 
lots in the blue sky in fee simple.”25 
Other states quickly followed suit, enacting similar laws that required 
a public official to rule on the “merits” of a securities offering before it 
could be sold to their citizens.26  Such legislation, however, proved 
ineffective to halt securities fraud on a national level.27  With the stock 
market rising steadily during the following decade of the roaring twenties, 
movements for investor protection from the federal government never 
gained traction.28 
in which robber baron Jay Gould was able to take advantage of poor regulation and disrupt 
the U.S. gold market). 
After the Panic of 1907 President Theodore Roosevelt asked Congress for federal legislation 
“to prevent at least the grosser forms of gambling in securities and commodities, such as 
making large sales of what men do not possess and ‘cornering’ the market.”  Steve Thel, 
The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 
385, 396 (1990). 
President Teddy Roosevelt was also famous for denouncing unscrupulous business leaders 
as “malefactors of great wealth.”  MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT:  THE RISE AND 
FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870-1920 177 (2003). 
 24. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 21, at 9. 
 25. Id.  Kansas was such a hotbed of radicalism in the early 20th century that more 
moderate Americans were then asking, “What’s the Matter with Kansas.”  See, e.g., 
THOMAS FRANK, WHAT’S THE MATTER WITH KANSAS?  HOW CONSERVATIVES WON THE 
HEART OF AMERICA (2005) (giving that question an ironic twist by using it as the title of a 
recent book exploring how that state has now come to be dominated by right-wing 
extremists). 
 26. Those state regulatory schemes were left intact by the Securities Act in 1933, but 
were later partially pre-empted by the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416.  See infra notes 153-61 and accompanying text. 
 27. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 20 (Thomas West 
2005); see Carol L. Simon, The Effect of the 1933 Securities Act on Investor Information 
and the Performance of New Issues, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 295, 297 (1989) (“These state 
statutes suffered from the lack of uniform standards and under-funded enforcement 
agencies.”). 
 28. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, The Investor’s Advocate:  How the SEC 
Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, at 2, July 
9, 2008, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (describing how investors, 
“tempted by promises of ‘rags to riches’ transformations and easy credit” poured money 
into the stock market in the decade following World War I). 
See Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation?  300 Years of Evidence, 75 
WASH. U. L. Q. 849, 851 (1997) (making the apt observation about how such situations 
impact regulatory reform, Banner states, “as long as the market has been rising or at least 
holding steady,” legislative proposals to curb securities fraud go nowhere because “too 
many people have been making too much money to favor regulation restricting trading”). 
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B. The Impetus for Federal Reform 
Nevertheless, the stock market crash of October 1929 brought 
unprecedented losses to the millions of shareholders who had sought to 
share in the prosperity of the industrial economy.  Approximately half of 
the securities sold during the preceding decade became worthless.  Investor 
confidence collapsed as those losses multiplied during the ensuing Great 
Depression.29 
Given these significant market failures, Franklin Roosevelt 
campaigned for president in 1932, pledging financial reform as an essential 
ingredient for economic recovery.30  To that end, the Democratic Party’s 
platform promised a system of mandatory securities registration with this 
plank:  “We advocate protection of the investing public by requiring to be 
filed with the government . . . of all offerings of foreign and domestic 
stocks and bonds true information as to bonuses, commissions, principal 
invested, and interests of the sellers.”31  Even before Roosevelt took office, 
Congressional hearings revealed in detail various fraudulent practices by 
securities dealers that had severely crippled the nation’s economy.32 
The same month that President Roosevelt took office, he 
recommended that Congress pass legislation that would mandate full 
disclosure in the sale of securities.  “There is . . . an obligation upon us to 
insist that every issue of new securities . . . shall be accompanied by full 
publicity and information, and that no essentially important element 
attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying public.”33  An initial 
draft of such legislation was substantially revised in a whirlwind weekend 
session by a team of legal scholars assembled by Felix Frankfurter, then a 
professor at the Harvard Law School.34 
 29. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 28, at 3. 
 30. Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), available at 
www.bartleby.com/124/pres49.html (sounding that theme again in his inaugural address, 
President Roosevelt stated,  “[t]he rulers of the exchange of mankind’s goods have failed . . . 
. there must be an end to a conduct in banking and in business which too often has given to a 
sacred trust the likeness of callous and selfish wrongdoing”). 
 31. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN 
THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970 3 (1970). 
 32. See Landis, supra note 22, at 30; see also HAZEN, supra note 27, at 21. 
 33. S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 6 (1933); H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 1-2 (1933). 
 34. Landis, supra note 22, at 33-34. 
Describing that weekend drafting process and what it created, one commentator has stated: 
By late Saturday they had a draft that, more than fifty years later, still 
constitutes the main body of the Securities Act.  The Act is a masterpiece, an 
intellectual tour de force.  It is fun to work with once you know how.  For now, 
realize that when one works with the Securities Act, one plays a complex 
mental game devised by three exceptional minds over a weekend. 
Gary M. Brown, Approaching Securities Law, in UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIES LAWS 
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James M. Landis, a distinguished member of that group, later 
described how the Act was based on a disclosure theory which required the 
filing of a registration statement and a waiting period before the securities 
could be sold.  While the Act did not give the federal government authority 
to pass on the investment quality of the offering, an overseeing commission 
would be granted the power to keep issues off the market if the data in the 
registration statement were inadequate or false.35  Provisions for criminal 
and civil liability were also included to ensure that corporate officials 
would be honest and forthright with their investors.36 
After some legislative vetting,37 the bill quickly passed both houses of 
Congress and was signed into law by President Roosevelt on May 27, 
1933, less than three months after he had taken office.38  The new law 
appears to have had an immediate beneficial impact, returning public 
confidence to the stock market.  According to John Steele Gordon, a 
leading historian of business, “[t]he year 1933 would prove to be one of the 
best years of the twentieth century on Wall Street, although, of course, 
rebounding from a disastrously low base.  The Dow that year rose almost 
60 percent, and some brokerage firms even began hiring again.”39 
III. THE REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT 
A. The Purpose of Securities Registration 
As the Supreme Court has said, “[T]he design of the statute (The 
Securities Act) is to protect investors by promoting full disclosure of 
information thought necessary to informed investment decisions”40 and 
2007 15, 21 (2007). 
 35. Landis, supra note 22, at 34-35. 
 36. See id. at 35; see infra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 37. See MARY BRIGNANO & J. TOMLINSON FORT, REED SMITH:  A LAW FIRM 
CELEBRATES 125 YEARS 91 (2002) (citing comments of Ralph Demmler, the first 
Republican Chairman of the SEC appointed by President Eisenhower, who attributes 
influential input into the legislative process to Congressman Sam Rayburn who considered 
himself the father of the Securities Act). 
See also Landis, supra note 22, at 40 (recounting how John Foster Dulles led a group of 
New York lawyers to Congress to attack the legislation as “undermin[ing] our financial 
system”).  Rayburn, according to Landis, “exhibited considerable annoyance at these 
accusations” and “insisted that all that was being demanded was that the system should live 
up to its pretensions.”  Id. 
 38. See GORDON, supra note 23, at 334. 
 39. Id. at 336.  But as to new issues of securities, as one economist has noted, their 
market “ground to a virtual standstill in the early 1930s, recovering slowly by the close of 
the decade.”  Simon, supra note 27, at 298. 
 40. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co, 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953). 
Some see the current Supreme Court as unduly favorable to business interests at the expense 
of consumers and investors.  See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court, Inc.:  How the 
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“[t]he registration requirements are the heart of the Act.”41  The SEC has 
expanded on this logic by stating that the Securities Act “has two basic 
objectives:  (1) require that investors receive financial and other significant 
information concerning securities being offered for public sale; and (2) 
prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of 
securities.”42  Commentator Jeffrey Mann restates that objective with some 
punch, “The goal, of course, is to apply the disinfectant of sunlight to the 
black box of corporate management; the presumption is that issuers 
exposed to public scrutiny will not be able to exploit investor ignorance to 
their advantage.”43 
The Commission goes on to say “[a] primary means of accomplishing 
these goals is the disclosure of important financial information through the 
registration of securities.”44  This emphasis on the prevention of investor 
fraud has led one commentator to observe that the SEC has not historically 
been concerned with systematic risks which he defines as economic shock 
brought on by substantial volatility in asset prices.45  These systemic risks 
are more appropriately, he argues, the concerns of other regulators like the 
Nation’s Highest Court Became Increasingly Receptive to the Arguments of American 
Business, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY MAG., Mar. 16, 2008 at 38.  Yet in its recent session the High 
Court has again strongly endorsed the concept that business must operate under the rule of 
law with this remark, “a dynamic, free economy presupposes a high degree of integrity in all 
its parts, an integrity that must be underwritten by rules enforceable in fair, independent, 
accessible courts.”  Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific Atl., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 
770 (2008). 
 41. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 638 (1988). 
 42. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 28, at 16. 
 43. Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory of Disclosure Regulation and Other 
Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 475 (2007) (discussing the actions corporate 
agents will take to circumvent information regulation and their costs). 
The author there echoes Justice Brandeis’s classic comment, “Publicity is justly commended 
as a remedy for social and industrial diseases.  Sunlight is said to be the best of 
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”  LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER 
PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (Fredrick A. Stokes Company 1914). 
 44. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 28, at 16. 
The Commission’s comments evoke the preamble to the Securities Act which states:  “An 
Act to provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and 
foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for 
other purposes.”  Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§77a-77aa (2007)).  On this point, see also C. Steven Bradford, Transaction 
Exemptions in the Securities Act of 1933:  An Economic Analysis, 45 EMORY L.J. 591, 598-
602 (1996) (amplifying the Commission’s assertions about the benefits of registration).  
Bradford's article states that the information provided in a registration might better enable 
investors to evaluate the returns that their securities will generate and therefore provide a 
more accurate price for the stock.  The article also says that such an accurate price brought 
about by registration may reduce the riskiness of a security.  It cites several studies that 
dispute or corroborate those findings but finds them inconclusive.  Id. 
 45. See Troy A. Parades, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds:  The SEC’s 
Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 990 (2006).  
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Federal Reserve and the Treasury.46 
Yet the Commission defines its mission as three-fold:  not just “to 
protect investors,” but also to “maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, 
and facilitate capital formation.”47  Supporting those objectives are remarks 
that were included in the official description of the statute at the time of its 
enactment.  They state that the Act was also designed to foster the broader 
goals of our economy by bolstering public confidence in business and 
directing financing to its most productive uses.48  Additionally, as one 
distinguished authority has noted, “[T]here is little question that disclosure 
has a substantial impact on the normative conduct of corporations.  In this 
regard, the Commission’s disclosure policies . . . have played a positive 
role in influencing the establishment of improved standards of conduct.”49 
B. The Process of Registration 
Section 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933 prohibits the offer of 
securities by federal jurisdictional means without first filing a registration 
statement for them with the SEC.50  Correspondingly, Section 5(a)(1) of the 
 46. Id.  In the same article, however, Professor Parades (now SEC Commissioner) 
states that governmental intervention in the market “also serves the larger goal of promoting 
capital formation and more efficient and liquid securities markets in that investor protection 
regulation can shore up investor confidence in the integrity of the securities markets.” Id. at 
1005 
 47. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 28, at 1. 
The Commission repeats that assertion by stating in a recent report that one of its four 
strategic goals is to “promote healthy capital markets.”  U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, 2007 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 24 (2007); see also Marcel 
Kahan, Securities Law and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L. J. 
977, 979 (1992) (quoting one commentator who has crisply put this objective:  “one 
principal goal of securities laws:  [is] to create stock markets in which the market price of a 
stock corresponds to its fundamental value”). 
 48. See S. REP. NO. 73-47 (1933) (“[The Act is] to protect honest enterprise, seeking 
capital by honest presentation, against the competition afforded by dishonest securities 
offered to the public through crooked promotion; to restore the confidence of a prospective 
investor in his ability to select sound securities; to bring into productive channels of industry 
and development capital which has grown timid to the point of hoarding; and to aid in 
providing employment and restoring buying and consuming power.”). 
 49. MARC I. STEINBERG, CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS:  A CORPORATE AND 
SECURITIES LAW PERSPECTIVE 29 (1983). 
The notion that securities registration would promote a new public policy toward business, 
one that would lead it to operate more for the common good, was also part of the vision of 
the New Deal.  As Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, an early staffer and later 
chairman of the SEC wrote of the Securities Act, “[i]t is symbolic of a shift of political 
power.  That shift is from the bankers to the masses; from the promoter to the investor.  It 
means the government is taking the side of the helpless, the suckers, the underdogs.”  
William O. Douglas, Protect the Investor, 23 YALE L. REV. 521, 522 (1934). 
 50. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2006); see also Section 2(a)(3) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§77b(a)(3) (2006) (defining “offer” broadly as including “every attempt or offer to dispose 
  
760 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 11:3 
 
 
Act prohibits the sale of securities unless the registration statement has 
become effective.51  Violation of these provisions is not only a crime,52 but 
also gives one who purchases these securities a right to rescind the 
transaction.53  The contents of a registration statement are prescribed by the 
Act.  It must contain a prospectus providing specific items of factual 
information to investors.54  The Commission has promulgated specific 
regulations which govern those disclosures and forms which the issuer 
must employ in this process.55 
The completion of a successful registration is a rather complicated 
matter requiring the skills of attorneys, accountants, investment bankers 
and the active cooperation of the issuer’s officials.56  The prospectus must 
contain all the information called for by the Commission’s regulations and 
forms.57  Such disclosure, however, is necessary but not sufficient because 
the anti-fraud provisions of the Act compel the revelation of all facts that 
an investor would consider important in making a decision to purchase the 
of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security or interest in a security, for value”). 
 51. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1) (2006). 
 52. Section 24 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (2006). 
 53. Section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(1); see also MARC I. 
STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 207 (4th ed. 2007) (explaining that Section 
12(a)(1) is designed to “give teeth” to the registration requirement). 
 54. Section 10 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (2006); see also Section 2(a)(10) 
of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C §77b(a)(10) (2006) (defining prospectus broadly as, among 
other things, any writing “which offers any security for sale or confirms”). 
 55. See Section 7(b)(1) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77g(b)(1) (empowering the 
SEC to prescribe further information for a registration statement); Section 10(c) of the 
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.§ 77j(c) (giving the Commission such power in regard to the 
prospectus).  For such regulations, see, e.g., Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229 (2006), 
Regulation S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210 (2006), and Regulation C, 17 C.F.R. § 230 (2007).  For 
registration forms, see, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 239.0-1-239.65 (2008). 
 56. See Bradford, supra note 44, at 602-08 (listing these direct costs of registration:  (1) 
the direct expenses of preparing, filing and distributing the required disclosure documents, 
(2) the commissions and fees paid to underwriters and others selling the securities, (3) the 
delay associated with registration, (4) the costs of maintaining the government registration 
system, and (5) other miscellaneous costs associated with registration, and also discussing 
certain other costs of registration that he says are less direct and more difficult to quantify 
such as having to make public disclosure about one’s business and subjecting the company 
to filing periodic and other reports with the SEC required by the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934).  See generally Carl W. Schneider et al., Going Public:  Practice, Procedure, and 
Consequences, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1981) (covering the practice and procedure of selling 
securities to the public for the first time). 
 57. See supra, note 55 and accompanying text; see also U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Registration under the Securities Act of 1933, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/regis33.htm (last visited July 10, 2008) (summarizing the 
essential facts that a prospectus must contain in these four categories:  (1) A description of 
the company’s properties and business; (2) A description of the security to be offered for 
sale; (3) Information about the management of the company; and (4) Financial statements 
certified by independent accounts). 
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securities.58  In the end, all this activity is directed toward the preparation 
of a document that will satisfy the SEC’s staff, who may review it and must 
typically accelerate its effective date before the issuer may sell the 
securities.59 
In addition, when an issuer is “in registration” great care must be 
taken to ensure that the company complies with the provisions of the Act 
that govern what conduct it may undertake to market the securities during 
various periods of this process.  Those subsections of Section 5, which are 
supplemented by extensive SEC rules,60 are geared toward making sure 
that investors get their primary information about the offering from the 
 58. See Sections 24 and 32 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77x, 78ff (2006) (making 
violators of the anti-fraud provisions of Section 17 of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of 
the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5, subject to civil 
penalties); Section 11 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006) (setting forth a detailed 
scheme listing those defendants who may be liable to purchasers for any material 
misstatements or omissions in an effective registration statement, and also enumerating 
certain affirmative defenses which those individuals may maintain, most importantly the 
“due diligence” defense); Section 15 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (2006) 
(providing that a person who controls a person liable under Section 11 or 12 shall be jointly 
and severally liable with that controlled person, unless such controlling person did not have 
knowledge of the facts or reasonable grounds to believe in the existence of such facts upon 
which the controlled person’s liability is predicated); Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, 
15 U.S.C. §77l(a)(2) (imposing civil liability on any person who offers or sells securities by 
means of a written or oral communication containing material misstatements or omissions); 
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995) (holding that similar to Section 11 liability, 
the remedy under § 77l(a)(2) is limited to purchasers of securities in public offerings); 
Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (allowing certain 
individuals to avoid liability under § 77k if they can show that they meet a specific standard 
of knowledge or conduct with respect to the material misstatements or omissions). 
Courts have also long recognized an implied right of action for securities fraud under 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), 15 
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2008) and 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008).  It exists despite the express 
remedies of Sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act and is not limited to securities sold in a 
public offering.  See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983). 
 59. See Section 8 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77h (providing that a registration 
statement will become effective 20 days after it is filed or earlier if the SEC accelerates the 
effective date).  In practice issuers always seek acceleration by the Commission and, for that 
cooperation, the SEC may seek to have the issuer make changes in its registration statement 
as provided in Securities Act Rule 461.  17 C.F.R. § 230.461 (2007).  See also HAZEN, 
supra note 27, at 125-32 (providing more information regarding the SEC review process). 
 60. For purpose of the application of Section 5, the registration process is generally 
divided into three time-frames:  (1) the pre-filing period (the time before the registration 
statement is filed), (2) the waiting period (the time between filing and the registration 
statement becoming effective), and (3) the post-effective period.  Generally Section 5(c) 
prohibits offers during the pre-filing period and Section 5(a)(1) prohibits sales until the post-
effective period.  Section 5(b)(1) restricts the use of prospectuses during the waiting period. 
The Commission’s rules made to augment these statutory prohibitions are complex and not 
easy to summarize.  For a good general discussion, see HAZEN, supra note 27, at 73-103.  In 
2005, the Commission liberalized this process.  See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying 
text. 
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registration statement, which is presumed to be accurate because its 
disclosure is made under penalty of criminal and civil liability.61 
C. Reforms by the SEC to Facilitate Registration 
Ever since the deregulatory movement began in the late 1970s, the 
Commission has been sensitive to the charge that registration is unduly 
costly and burdensome on issuers, inhibiting the formation of capital and 
even discouraging entrepreneurship.62  The SEC’s first significant reform 
in this area was to integrate the disclosure requirements under the 
Securities Act with those of its companion legislation, the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).63  While the former statute, as has 
been discussed,64 requires registration of securities before they are offered 
and sold to the public, the latter imposes a regime of continuous disclosure 
once those companies becom 65
That system of dual disclosure was not only duplicative, the 
Commission found, but much information was already available about 
publicly-traded firms and embedded in the price of their stock.66  So, since 
1982, the SEC has allowed companies that are already making periodic and 
 61. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 62. See Roberta A. Karmel, Regulation by Exemption:  The Changing Definition of an 
Accredited Investor, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 681, 700 (2008) (explaining that the SEC’s answer to 
this criticism has been to expand the exemptions to registration rather than making it “more 
user-friendly and less likely to result in after-the-fact lawsuits”). 
 63. See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Exchange Act Release No. 6383, 47 
Fed. Reg. 11,380 (Mar. 16, 1982). 
 64. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text. 
 65. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 28 at 17-18 (“The 
[Exchange] Act also empowers the SEC to require periodic reporting of information by 
companies with publicly traded securities.  Companies with more than $10 million in assets 
whose securities are held by more than 500 owners must file annual and other periodic 
reports.  These reports are available to the public through the SEC’s EDGAR database.”). 
These periodic reports are required by Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act.  15 U.S.C. § 
78m(a) (2006).  They include the annual report on Form 10-K required by Exchange Act 
Rule 13a-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (2008), the quarterly report on Form 10-Q required by 
Exchange Act Rule 13a-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-13 (2008), and current reports on Form 8-
K required by Exchange Act Rule 13a-11, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11 (2006). 
 66. Professor Homer Kripke, a frequent critic of the SEC, restated the results of this 
efficient market hypothesis as it related to stock prices.  See Homer Kripke, Fifty Years of 
Securities Regulation in Search of a Purpose, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 257, 273 (1984) (“The 
economists concluded that for most investors the best program is to assume that market 
prices reflect all available information, the market is fair, and market prices are the best 
evidence of value.”). 
As other commentators have noted, however, “[s]mall firms not subject to the SEC’s 
mandatory corporate disclosure system seem to have been responsible for a majority of 
fraud cases brought by the Commission.”  LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 21, at 36.  
Accordingly, issuers of securities that are not subject to the Exchange Act’s periodic 
disclosure requirements must do full blown registration statements when selling securities. 
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other reports under the Exchange Act to either use them as the bases of 
their prospectuses when doing another registered offering, or in certain 
cases just presume that such information is already at hand for interested 
investors.  Over the years the Commission has sought to refine that 
approach.67 
The SEC has also promulgated registration forms with relaxed 
disclosure burdens for small businesses seeking to raise a limited amount of 
capital from the public.68  In addition, the Commission has allowed issuers 
to register securities and “put them on the shelf” for sale at a later time 
when market conditions may be more favorable.69  This not only can help 
issuers maximize their investment revenue, but can also allow them to 
avoid costly delays when they want to make securities sales to the public. 
In 2005, furthermore, the SEC promulgated new rules significantly 
liberalizing the offering activities that are permitted to certain companies 
during the period they are “in registration.”70  In doing so, the Commission 
created several categories of issuers based on their reporting status under 
the Exchange Act and their capitalization and trading activity in the public 
markets.  The two largest of these, the “seasoned issuer”71 and the “well-
known seasoned issuer” (WKSIs),72 are allowed the most latitude in 
offering activity during the registration process.  For instance, there are no 
restrictions on the statements or solicitation activities of well-known 
seasoned issuers during the entire registration process.73 
 67. See HAZEN, supra note 27, at 117-18. 
 68. See Forms SB-1 and SB-2; see also STEINBERG, supra note 53, at 131-32 (providing 
standards for the use of these forms). 
 69. Securities Act Rule 415, 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (2008); Shelf Registration, Securities 
Act Release No. 6499, Fed. Reg. 52,889 (Nov. 23, 1983).  
 70. Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722, 
44,725-27 (Aug. 3, 2005). 
 71. Id. at 44,730 (defining seasoned issuers as companies that are required to file 
reports under the Exchange Act and are eligible to use either registration Form F-3 or S-3 
but do not qualify as WKSIs, meaning that the issuer has at least $75 million of outstanding 
securities held by non-affiliates or has a certain minimum investment grade rating on its 
debt securities).  
 72. Securities Act Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2008) (defining WKSIs as 
companies that have been reporting companies under the Exchange Act for at least one year, 
that are timely in their Exchange Act filings, and that either:  (1) have a worldwide market 
value of all their common equity held by non-affiliates of at least $700 million, or (2) have 
issued in the past three years at least an aggregate principal amount of nonconvertible 
securities other than common equity of $1 billion). 
 73. Securities Act Rule 163, 17 C.F.R. § 230.163 (2005); see also Eric A. Chiappinelli, 
Gun Jumping:  The Problem of Extraneous Offers of Securities, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 457 
(1989) (calling for such reform as it might pertain to the pre-filing period before their 
passage).  But see Joseph F. Morrissey, Rhetoric and Reality:  Investor Protection and the 
Securities Regulation Reform of 2005, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 561 (2007) (arguing trenchantly 
that the Commission has gone too far with those reforms and is neglecting its mission of 
protecting investors). 
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IV. QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF REGISTRATION 
A. The Arguments to Abolish Registration 
Despite its widespread acceptance as a cornerstone of New Deal 
reforms, business interests have never liked registration or any federal 
regulation of securities.  Ralph H. Demmler, appointed as the first 
Republican Chairman of the SEC by President Eisenhower, recalls that Ike 
told him that “he (President Eisenhower) did not know much about the 
Securities and Exchange Commission but that some of his friends in New 
York thought the whole bunch of securities laws should be repealed.”74  
Demmler says he advised the president “that no such repeal would be 
possible or desirable,” and Ike agreed.75 
More pointed attacks on registration and the whole regime of 
securities disclosure, however, have come from the academy.  Beginning in 
the 1960s Professors Stigler,76 Bentson,77 and Manne78 presented empirical 
evidence which they claimed indicated that the federal securities laws did 
not enhance investor value.  Their results, however, were widely criticized 
for reaching an incorrect conclusion because they examined the wrong 
variables.79  In further repudiation, an Advisory Committee on Corporate 
Disclosure set up by the SEC to investigate the findings of those studies 
concluded “that the disclosure system established by Congress . . . is sound 
and does not need radical reform or renovation.”80 
Academic criticism of mandated corporate disclosure has continued 
nonetheless, much of it apparently motivated by distaste for government 
 74. BRIGNANO & FORT, supra note 37, at 89. 
 75. Id. 
 76. George Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 19 BUS. LAW. 721 
(1964). 
 77. George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market:  An Evaluation of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132 (1973).   
 78. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).  But see Roy A. 
Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price:  A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 
53 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1439 (1967) (“Even if we found that unfettered insider trading would 
bring an economic gain, we might still forego that gain in order to secure a stock market and 
intracorporate relationships that satisfy such noneconomic goals as fairness, just rewards 
and integrity.”). 
 79. See Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, Economies, Capital Markets, and 
Securities Laws 33 (University of Texas School of Law, Law and Economics Research 
Paper No. 73, 2006) (citing a number of studies to that effect which also established the 
positive results for investors arising from the disclosure mandated by the federal securities 
laws); Simon, supra note 27, at 313 (finding that, after the passage of the Securities Act, 
“uniform regulation lowered new-issues risk, and in some cases, increased expected 
returns”) 
 80. H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., REPORT OF THE 
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SEC 95-29 (Comm. Print 1977). 
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regulation81 and a credulous attitude about the all-encompassing benefits of 
the free-market.82  As a leading author has noted, a lot of that has “an 
unreal quality.”83  Many of those anti-regulatory approaches begin, 
appropriately enough, with the common-sense assumption that corporate 
managers who are entrusted with other people’s money will have an 
obvious temptation to enrich themselves in various ways at the expense of 
their public shareholders.84  Yet these conservative theorists go on to assert 
that this inherent conflict can be overcome by non-governmental forces.85 
For instance, these theorists assert that reputational concerns will 
require that corporate officials deal honestly with their stockholders.86  
 81. See Edward L. Glaeser, Psychology and the Market, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 408, 412 
(2004) (“[T]he case for laissez-faire is based more on the fallibility of the state than on the 
perfection of markets.”).  In this area, the law and economics school is prominent.  See, e.g., 
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of 
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669 (1984). 
 82. See Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 
777 (2006) (discussing alternatives to a strong SEC such as a regulatory competition 
model). 
 83.  LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 21, at 32; see also E.J. DIONNE, JR., STAND UP FIGHT 
BACK 112 (2004) (“[C]apitalism cannot work without regulation, which is simply a fancy 
word for rules and laws.  Powerful people will often take advantage of their muscle unless 
someone—like it or not, that someone usually works for the government—keeps an eye on 
them.”). 
 84. Scholars more favorable to government regulation also emphasize this point, of 
course.  For capital markets to provide the type of financing that a thriving economy needs, 
investors must be willing to turn their funds over to others to manage for them.  See Cross & 
Prentice, supra note 79, at 7 (“The basic economic problem is how to control the investment 
risk so that investors will be willing to risk their funds.  Solving or ameliorating this 
problem is of enormous social value.  Absent a solution, many investors will choose not to 
play the game at all, while others will discount the securities they purchase to take into 
account the increased risk of loss.”). 
 85. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 306 (1976) (stating 
that the separation of ownership from control in a large public corporation explains “why 
accounting reports would be provided voluntarily to creditors and stockholders, and why 
independent auditors would be engaged by management to testify to the accuracy and 
correctness of such reports”). 
 86. See Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers:  A Market-Based Proposal, 88 
CAL. L. REV. 279 (2000) (reflecting a viewpoint that investors should be able to price 
privately-supplied investor protections including those against fraud).  But see Cross & 
Prentice, supra note 79, at 5 (“His unfortunate timing in publishing this proposal just as 
Andy Fastow, Bernie Ebbers, Ken Lay, Jeff Skilling, Jack Grubman, Henry Blodgett, 
Richard Scrushy, Dennis Kozlowski, Mark Swartz, Richard Causey and so many others 
decided to forfeit their reputations in exchange for short-term lucre, does not necessarily 
mean that it might not be resurrected when memories fade.”); Diana B. Henriques and 
Zachery Kouwe, Top Trader is Accused of Defrauding Clients, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2008 
at B1, B5 (suggesting that specific infamy must go to Bernard Madoff who admitted in the 
last weeks of 2008 that his money management firm was “all just one big lie” and “basically 
a giant ponzi scheme”).  Total losses suffered by Madoff’s blue-chip clientele may amount 
to fifty billion dollars.  Diana B. Henriques and Alex Berenson, The 17th Floor; Where 
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Furthermore, competition for capital will compel firms to furnish potential 
purchasers of their securities with all of the relevant information they 
desire.87  Correspondingly, conservative theorists claim that contractual 
mechanisms can guarantee the veracity and sufficiency of this voluntary 
disclosure.88  By such private arrangements, structural devices, such as 
auditing,89 can also be set up to monitor management’s behavior and 
incentives, such as stock options plans, can be created to better align 
management and shareholder interests.90 
Wealth Went to Vanish, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2008 at A1. 
 87. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 81, at 681-85, 715 (making the case for 
“self-induced” disclosure but ultimately taking a rather diffident approach to the arguments 
that would repeal our system of mandatory disclosure by stating that “[w]e cannot say that 
the existing securities laws are beneficial, but we also are not confident that their probable 
replacements would be better”); see also Kripke supra note 66, at 270-71 (noting that a 
wide-spread system of informal corporate disclosure exists outside the Commission’s 
mandatory regime).  While Professor Kripke was a long time advocate for the proposition 
that securities regulation was unnecessary, the author heard Professor Kripke at UCLA law 
school in 1978 admitting that, based on his own observations, the quality of corporate 
disclosure and the honesty of the securities markets have been greatly improved by the 
Securities Act.  See also Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International 
Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387 (2001) (arguing that quality 
companies will want to “signal” their quality through voluntary disclosures). 
 88. See Edward Glaeser, Simon Johnson & Andrei Schleifer, Coase Versus the 
Coasians, 116 Q. J. ECON. 853, 853 (2001) (“[T]he buyers and issuers of securities have 
available to them a vast range of private arrangements to achieve efficiency, including 
contracts such as corporate charters, certification by intermediaries, and various forms of 
bonding [that] . . . render most laws and regulations unnecessary.”).  But see Cross & 
Prentice, supra note 79, at 22 (indicating that while such provisions seemingly protect 
investors, they may be susceptible to various judicial interpretations and ultimately require 
monitoring of management’s performance; as such, they are not a substitute for the 
standardized disclosure and enforcement rules that are a central benefit of securities 
regulation). 
 89. Some of this protection, it is argued, can be provided by not only auditors but also 
other third party monitors, such as analysts, or rating agencies.  Unfortunately, many of 
these “watchdogs” have proven to be anything but zealous in their oversight activities on 
behalf of shareholders.  Laxity and lack of integrity by outside accountants, as epitomized 
by the Enron scandal, have famously sparked the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation.  Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C) which established a Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board to monitor the actions of auditors.  It also promulgated stricter standards 
for auditor independence, enhanced financial disclosure requirements, and stiffened 
penalties for white collar crimes.  See Joris M. Hogan, The Enron Legacy:  Corporate 
Governance Requirements for a New Era, 31 SEC. REG. L.J. 142 (2003) (outlining the 
circumstances surrounding the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002); see also 
supra note 6 and accompanying text (describing the blatant corruption of analysts and rating 
agencies). 
 90. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not How Much You 
Pay, But How, HARV. BUS. REV., May-June 1990 at 138.  See also Daniel J. Morrissey, The 
Path of Corporate Law:  Of Options Backdating, Derivative Suits, and the Business 
Judgment Rule, 86 OR. L. REV. 973 (2008) (highlighting recent scandals involving the 
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In addition, critics of mandatory registration often point to criminal 
penalties and civil liability provisions for those who make material 
misrepresentations and omissions in the offering or sale of securities.91  
While such laws can certainly be used to punish and deter fraudsters and 
provide remedies for their victims, such ex post solutions afford no up-front 
protection to investors who have already been induced to part with their 
money on the basis of inaccurate or incomplete information.92  Since those 
funds are often squandered or frittered away by unscrupulous promoters, 
such measures may amount to merely closing the barn door after the horses 
have left.93 
B. The Arguments to Abolish Registration are not Convincing 
While these voluntary, contractual, and reputational approaches may 
have some benefit to investors, they fall considerably short of guaranteeing 
that investors will receive the full and uniform disclosure that registration 
mandates.94  Even if full disclosure is required for an issuer to sell its 
securities for the optimum price, firms may still decide not to reveal 
information if they believe that such information will be advantageous to 
their competitors95 or embarrassing to management.96 
backdating of stock options). 
 91. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (outlining penalties and liabilities 
pursuant to federal securities laws).  But see Easterbrook & Fishel, supra note 81, at 677-79 
(indicating that while a legal regime without such fraud protection is theoretically possible, 
even jurists from the law and economic school see it as beneficial).  See generally Abry 
Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisitions LLC, 891 A.2d 1032 (2006) (deciding against 
interpreting a stock purchase agreement to totally disallow claims for intentional fraud on 
public policy grounds). 
 92. Joseph A. Franco, Why Antifraud Prohibitions are not Enough:  The Significance of 
Opportunism, Candor and Signaling in the Economic Case for Mandatory Securities 
Disclosure, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 223 (2002). 
 93. See, e.g., Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, The Rabbi, the Do-Gooder, the Lost $100 Million, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2008 at C1 (providing an unfortunately typical example of a massive 
fraud upon investors primarily from the Orthodox Jewish community revealed in August 
2008, when money was raised without SEC registration through approximately 60 “private 
placements”); see also Ian Urbina, A Palm Beach Enclave, Stunned by an Inside Job, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 15, 2008 (stating that “[t]he Madoff scandal also appears to have involved 
significant affinity fraud among Jewish-Americans”). 
 94. An appropriate analogy here is to the uniform system of weights and measures that 
nations adopt to standardize their commerce.  If each merchant could set her own definition 
for a “pound” or a “gram,” trading would be made bewilderingly complex.  See Ralph K 
Winter, On ‘Protecting the Ordinary Investor,’ 63 WASH. L. REV. 881, 891 (1988) (warning 
against the costly alternative of having disclosure requirements imposed by various states). 
 95. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 21, at 37. 
 96. See Item 402 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2008) (requiring extensive 
disclosure of management’s related party transactions with the issuer and of management’s 
compensation packages). 
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On top of that, there may be substantial reasons in some cases for 
corporate officials to be less than honest with their investors, at least in the 
short run.  Such situations would obviously occur when management’s 
compensation or even its survival would depend on suppressing bad 
news.97  Even when corporate officials have no actual intent to deceive, 
they may have a tendency to put the firm’s results in the best light or to 
hope unfavorable results will be temporary and thus not need to be 
disclosed.98 
In short, the realities of “human greed and short-sightedness,”99 so 
much in evidence during the contemporary economic turmoil, refute these 
deregulatory theories.  Rather, they confirm the abiding need for strict, 
mandatory measures to protect investors and present a cogent case for the 
revitalization of securities registration. 
V.  THE EXEMPTIONS FROM REGISTRATION 
A. The Exemptions in General 
Not every offering of securities must be registered with the SEC.  
Certain classes are deemed “exempt securities” in Section 3100 of the Act, 
and certain specific transactions are freed from the registration mandate by 
Section 4.101  The Commission summarizes the most important of these 
exemptions in four categories:  (1) private offerings to a limited number of 
persons or institutions; (2) offerings of limited size; (3) intrastate offerings; 
and (4) securities of municipal, state, and federal governments.102  It then 
goes on to state, “[b]y exempting many small offerings from the 
registration process, the SEC seeks to foster capital formation by lowering 
 97. H.R. REP. NO. 95-29, supra note 80; see also Roger Lowenstein, The Benign 
Corporate Oligarchy, N.Y. TIMES, SUNDAY MAGAZINE, Dec. 12, 2004, at 54 (describing the 
continuing tendency of corporate executives to manipulate their accounting figures by citing 
a study by Campbell Harvey, a professor at Duke University, finding “that a remarkable 
78% of 302 chief financial officers said they would take some action to ‘smooth’ quarterly 
earnings and meet expectations, even if that action sacrificed long-term value”). 
 98. Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions:  A Behavioral Theory of Why 
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social Harm), 146 U. PA. 
L. REV. 101 (1997). 
 99. Prentice, supra note 82, at 778; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the 
Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984); Merritt B. 
Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure:  Why Issuer Choice is Not Investor 
Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999); Michael D. Guttentag, An Argument for 
Imposing Disclosure Requirements on Public Companies, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 123 (2004) 
(supporting the SEC’s mandatory disclosure system). 
 100. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (2004). 
 101. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1980). 
 102. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 57, at 1. 
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the costs of offering securities to the public.”103 
B. The Non-Public Exemption Geared toward “Sophisticated” Investors 
Many exempt offerings, however, are not small, either in the dollar 
amounts they raise or in the number of investors they involve.  The 
exemption for transactions “not involving any public offering,”104 the so-
called private placements of securities, literally contains no limits on its 
applicability, and in Ralston Purina, the Supreme Court refused to impose 
any such limits.105  Rather, the Court said the exemption exists for those 
who can “fend for themselves,”106 i.e., those who do not need the disclosure 
compelled by a registration statement to make “informed investment 
decisions.”107 
One commentator states that this “sophisticated offeree exemption” is 
designed for those with “sophistication, bargaining power, or access to 
information about the issuer, [who] do not need the protection that 
registration provides.”108  This interpretation corresponds to some rather 
terse legislative history on the provision stating that the exemption is 
intended for situations “where there is no practical need for (the Act’s) 
application (or) where the public benefits are too remote.”109 
Early case law after Ralston Purina interpreted the exemption 
narrowly, making it virtually inapplicable to offerings made to non-
institutional investors who were not top officials of the issuer.110  In 
response, the Commission used its rulemaking authority to create an 
administrative “safe harbor,”111 Rule 146,112 which more clearly and 
expansively defined a nonpublic offering.113 
In general, Rule 146 provided that such offerings would qualify for 
 103. Id. 
 104. Section 4(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1980). 
 105. Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 125-26. 
 106. Id. at 125. 
 107. Id. at 124. 
 108. Bradford, supra note 44, at 622-23. 
 109. H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 5 (1933). 
 110. See, e.g., Hill York Corp. v. Am. Int’l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 
1971); SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137, 158 (5th Cir. 1972) (limiting the 
registration exemption after Ralston Purina). 
 111. See Section 19(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §77s(a) (2002) (empowering the 
Commission to prescribe rules and regulations to carry out provisions of the Act and makes 
good faith compliance with those administration pronouncements a defense to any civil 
liability imposed by the Act). 
 112. Securities Act Rule 146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (repealed 47 Fed. Reg. 11,261 
(1982)).  
 113. Notice of Adoption of Rule 146 Under the Securities Act of 1933—“Transactions 
by an Issuer Deemed Not to Involve and Public Offering,” Securities Act Release No. 33-
5487, 4 S.E.C. Docket, 1974 WL 161966 (April 23, 1974). 
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the exemption if the issuer reasonably believed that the securities were not 
purchased by more than 35 persons (excluding purchasers of more than 
$150,000).114  In addition, every offeree would have to be either financially 
sophisticated or have the ability to bear investment risks and obtain the 
advice of a financial expert.115  Each offeree also would have to be 
furnished with information comparable to what she would get in a 
registration statement.116  Investors so qualified would then, according to 
the Commission, satisfy the Ralston Purina criteria that private placement 
offerees be able to “fend for themselves.”117 
Even after the exemption for non-public offerings was broadened by 
Rule 146, criticism continued that its criteria were still overly technical and 
unduly burdensome to small business.118  Congress, responding to the small 
business lobby, then added Section 4(6) to the Act in 1980119 to prod the 
SEC into further liberalizing the private placement exemption.120  It freed 
offerings under $5 million from registration if they were made only to 
“accredited investors.”  Congress defined “accredited investors” to include 
certain financial institutions and other persons that the SEC might so 
designate “on the basis of such factors as financial sophistication, net 
worth, knowledge, and experience in financial matters, or amount of assets 
under management.”121 
Taking its cue from that legislation, as well as the deregulatory fervor 
of the Reagan administration, in 1982, the Commission replaced Rule 146 
with Rule 506 of Regulation D, a new and expanded safe-harbor provision 
designed to cover not only private placements but also other exemptions for 
 114. Securities Act Rule 146(g), 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(g) (repealed 47 Fed. Reg. 11,261 
(1982)).  
 115. Securities Act Rule 146(d), 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(d) (repealed 47 Fed. Reg. 11,261 
(1982)).  
 116. Securities Act Rule 146(e), 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(e) (repealed 47 Fed. Reg. 11,261 
(1982)).  
 117. Securities Act Release No. 33-5487, supra note 113, at 3.  Furthermore, to 
guarantee the non-public nature of the offering, there could be no general advertising or 
widespread solicitation of investors.  Securities Act Rule 146(c), 17 C.F.R. § 230.146(c) 
(repealed 47 Fed. Reg. 11,261 (1982)). There would also have to be limits on quick re-sales 
of the securities.  Securities Act Rule 146(h), 17 C.F.R. § 230 146(h) (repealed 47 Fed. Reg. 
11,261 (1982)). 
 118. See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Plight of Small Issuers Under the Securities 
Act of 1933:  Practical Foreclosure from the Capital Market, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1139, 1143, 
1168-69 (1977); H. David Heumann, Is SEC Rule 146 Too Subjective to Provide the Needed 
Predictability in Private Offerings?, 55 NEB. L. REV. 1, 9 (1975); Ellsworth A. Weinberg & 
Michael W. McManus, The Private Placement Exemption Under the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1933 Revisited, and Rule 146,  27 BAYLOR L. REV. 201 (1975) (criticizing 
the criteria for the exemption of non-public offerings). 
 119. Section 4(6) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (1980). 
 120. Karmel, supra note 62, at 688. 
 121. Section 2(a)(15)(ii) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(15)(ii) (2000). 
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small and limited offerings.122 
C. Enter the Accredited Investor 
Regulation D’s major innovation was the “accredited investor,” a 
category of securities purchasers who would automatically meet the 
Ralston Purina criteria of being able to fend for themselves (i.e. they would 
not need the disclosure compelled in a registration statement).  According 
to former SEC Commission Robert Karmel, this new concept has created a 
“huge exemption[] from [the SEC’s] regulatory scheme”123 and helped 
create “an enormous private placement market.”124  Included in the 
definition of that term are not only certain institutional investors125 and 
insiders of the issuer,126 but also individuals with net worths of at least $1 
million127 or annual incomes of at least $200,000 in each of the two most 
recent years with expectations of reaching that level in the current year.128 
Under Rule 506, then, the SEC allows an unlimited amount of money 
to be raised from any number of accredited investors who do not need to be 
supplied with any documentary disclosure.  For non-accredited investors, 
however, certain restrictions remain.  There can be no more than thirty-five 
of them,129 they have to be supplied with registration-like written 
information,130 and they or their advisors have to be financially 
sophisticated.131  In another change from 146, Rule 506 places no limits on 
the suitability of potential purchasers (offerees).  Advertising and general 
solicitation, however, are still deemed incompatible with the “non-public” 
nature of the exemption.132  Along those lines restrictions are also still kept 
 122. Regulation D, Securities Act Rules 501-06, Revision of Certain Exemptions for 
Registration for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release 
No. 33-6389 (March 8, 1982) (codified as amended at 17 C.F.R §§ 230.501 to 506 (2008)); 
see also Leonhardt, supra note 4, at 32 (“For three decades now, the American economy has 
been in what historian Sean Wilentz calls the Age of Reagan.  The government has 
deregulated industries, open the economy more to market forces and above all, cut income 
taxes.”). 
 123. Karmel, supra note 62, at 681. 
 124. Id. at 682. 
 125. Securities Act Rule 501(a)(1)-(3), (7-8), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a)(1)-(3), (7-8). 
 126. Securities Act Rule 501(a)(4), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a)(4). 
 127. Securities Act Rule 501(a)(5), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a)(5).  That total can include 
assets of both spouses.  Id. 
 128. Securities Act Rule 501(a)(6), 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(6).  For joint income of 
spouses that figure must be at least $300,000.  Id. 
 129. Securities Act Rule 506(b)(2)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(i). 
 130. Securities Act Rule 502(b), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b). 
 131. Securities Act Rule 506(b)(2)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii). 
 132. Securities Act Rule 502(c), 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c).  But see infra notes 225-27 and 
accompanying text (stating that the SEC’s proposed changes to Regulation D would loosen 
that requirement for “large accredited investors”). 
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on quick re-sales of the securities and the issuer must demonstrate that it 
has taken reasonable care to guard against them.133 
Registration is therefore unnecessary, according to the Commission’s 
Regulation D reasoning, if an investor has a certain amount of personal 
wealth.  These wealthy individuals, regardless of their business acumen, are 
automatically considered able to “fend for themselves” when it comes to 
decisions about securities.  Some questioned, however, whether that is 
actually the case134 and correspondingly whether the Commission had gone 
beyond its statutory authority in promulgating Regulation D. 
Ralston Purina interpreted the § 4(2) exemption as requiring that both 
offerees and purchasers be among “the particular class of persons . . . [who 
do not] need the protection of the Act.”135  Rule 506 however, with its 
focus solely on purchasers of the securities, dispenses with the need for any 
inquiry into the suitability of those to whom the investment is offered.  
Ralston Purina also held that the exemption was designed for those who 
“have access to the same kind of information that the act would make 
available in the form of a registration statement.”136  Yet Rule 506 has no 
requirement that accredited investors have such data available to them. 
Along those lines, case law following Ralston Purina held that for the 
private placement exemption to be satisfied, all investors would have to 
have access to the type of information that registration would provide.137  
Yet the actual situation did not follow that wealthy individuals would 
necessarily have such investment data.  Even if they did, there was no 
assurance that they on their own would have the sophistication to 
appropriately analyze the information.138  Put starkly, through Regulation D 
the SEC seemed to be abandoning attempts to safeguard from fraud 
investors with a certain amount of personal assets.139 
 133. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d).  But see infra notes 162-74 and accompanying text for a 
discussion on the resale market for private placement securities. 
 134. See infra note 138-39 and accompanying text. 
 135. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. at 125. 
 136. Id. at 125-26. 
 137. See Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 903 (5th Cir. 1977); Lawler v. 
Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283, 1289 (4th Cir. 1978). 
 138. As one contemporary observer remarked of Regulation D., “the reforms adopted by 
the SEC . . . may overestimate the abilities of the presumably wealthy. . . .  Experience 
indicates that the wealthy often do not have the sophistication to demand access to material 
information or otherwise to evaluate the merits and risks of a prospective investment.  
Consequently, they frequently fail to seek professional advice . . . .”  Manning Gilbert 
Warren III, A Review of Regulation D:  The Present Exemption Regimen for Limited 
Offerings Under the Securities Act of 1933, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 355, 382 (1984). 
 139. Compare id. (stating ruefully, “[i]t is important to note that the categories of 
‘wealthy’ investors frequently include the widows and orphans whose protection 
traditionally has been the sacred trust of the SEC”) with Jason Zweig, How Bernie Madoff 
Made Smart Folks Look Dumb, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13-14, 2008, at B1 (asserting that “[t]he 
Madoff fraud appears to have involved a large number of wealthy individuals and many 
  
2009] SECURITIES ACT AND REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT 773 
 
 
D. Limited Civil Liability to Deter Fraud in the Sale of 506 Securities 
In addition, those who purchase securities sold in unregistered 
offerings have weaker remedies if they are defrauded than those who buy 
securities in registered issuances.  Section 11 of the Securities Act provides 
a direct cause of action for materially false or misleading statements in an 
effective registration statement.140  On the other hand, private placees who 
are cheated in their investments must rely on the implied right of action that 
Courts have recognized under Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act.141  Rule 
10b-5 is much more exacting in its requirements for recovery than Section 
11 and therefore provides less a deterrent to fraud. 
Section 11 was designed to guarantee that, to the greatest extent 
possible, purchasers of registered securities would be afforded full 
disclosure of all aspects of their investment.142  Under Section 11, 
defrauded investors may bring direct federal claims against all officers of 
the issuer who sign the registration statement,143 all of the company’s 
directors,144 its underwriters,145 and its accountants.146  Those defendants 
can only escape liability if they can show that they were not negligent in 
the preparation of the registration statement, which in most cases requires 
that they prove that after a reasonable investigation they had no knowledge 
of any falsehoods or material omissions in the document.147 
Liability under 10b-5 on the other hand, is restricted to those who 
have actually made the material falsehoods or omitted to state the material 
facts to purchasers or sellers of the securities.148  Moreover, to escape 
investors who should have been sophisticated enough to be skeptical of a fund that 
purported to return 12% consistently over a number of years”).  
With the evidence of wide-spread investment fraud on the elderly, such concerns are even 
more pressing today.  See infra notes 233-36 and accompanying text. 
 140. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 141. Id. 
 This jurisprudence has been re-enforced since the Supreme Court interpreted another 
express cause of action for fraud in the Securities Act, § 12(a)(2), requiring that the 
securities under this type of action be sold in a public offering.  See Gustafson v. Alloyd 
Co., 513 U.S. 561 (1995); see also supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 142. STEINBERG, supra note 68, at 188. 
 143. Section 11(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. §  77k(a)(1). 
Section 6 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77f(a), lists those who must sign the registration 
statement which include the issuer, the issuer’s principal executive, financial and accounting 
officers and a majority of the issuer’s board of directors or persons performing similar 
functions. 
 144. Section 11(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(2). 
 145. Section 11(a)(5), 15 U.S.C.  § 77k(a)(5). 
 146. Section 11(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4). 
 147. Section 11(b)(3), 15 U.S.C.  § 77k(b)(3); see also Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp. 
283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (issuing findings of fact in a § 77k case). 
 148. See Central Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 551 U.S. 164 (1994) 
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liability in a Section 11 claim, defendants must show “due diligence” in the 
preparation of the registration statement.149  In a 10b-5 action, however, 
plaintiffs have the burden of not just proving but also pleading with 
particularity of facts150 that the defendants acted with “scienter”; that is, 
something more than mere negligence.151  Plaintiffs must also plead with 
particularity of facts to show that they relied on statements or omissions by 
the defendants that were materially false or misleading.152 
E. No State Registration for 506 Securities 
Furthermore, protection for investors in private placements has also 
been lessened by legislation which preempts state registration.  When 
Congress passed the Securities Act in 1933, it left state regulation of 
securities intact.153  States accordingly continued with their own 
requirements for the registration of securities sold to their citizens along 
with exemptions to that process, which in many instances mirrored the 
federal ones.154  In 1996, however, Congress passed the National Securities 
Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA)155 that pre-empted the power of states 
to require registration of “covered securities.”156  Those included, among 
(discussing the requirements for liability under 10b-5). 
 149. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 150. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007). 
 151. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (discussing the scienter 
standard). 
 152. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 769 (2008) 
(“Reliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant's deceptive acts is an essential element of the 
§ 10(b) private cause of action”). 
A presumption of investor reliance may be drawn when one with a duty of disclosure omits 
a material fact.  Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972).  
Likewise, reliance can be shown under the fraud-on-the-market doctrine, which presumes 
that a false or misleading statement has skewed the price of the security.  Basic, Inc. v. 
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).  But see Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 
336 (2005) (holding that a plaintiff cannot establish that defendants’ misstatements caused 
her economic loss merely by establishing and showing that the price of the stock was 
inflated on the date of purchase because of the misrepresentations). 
 153. The federal securities laws, when enacted in the 1930s, were viewed as a 
supplement to existing state laws rather than a substitute for them.  Richard H. Walker, 
Evaluating the Preemption Evidence:  Have the Proponents Met Their Burden?, 60 LAW & 
CONTEMPT. PROBS. 237, 237 (1997). 
Both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act contain express provisions preserving state 
law rights and remedies, Section 16 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77p, Section 28 of the 
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb. 
 154. The North American Securities Administrators Association promulgated a Uniform 
Limited Offering Exemption in 1983 that was intended to coordinate with Regulation D and 
to be the same among the states.  Securities Act Release No. 33-6561 (Dec. 6, 1984). 
 155. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 
Stat. 3416 (1996). 
 156. Section 18(a)(1) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)(1). 
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others, securities traded on a national securities exchange157 as well as 
those exempt from registration by SEC rules promulgated under Section 
4(2), such as Rule 50 158
The dual system of securities regulation left in place by Congress in 
1933 Act had long been criticized as being duplicative, unnecessarily 
expensive, and time-consuming.159  State regulators however operated for 
the most part on a separate premise than the SEC, one where the “merits” 
of the offering, not merely disclosure of its details, would determine 
whether a particular offering could go forward.160  This had the added 
benefit of assuring a second line of protection for investors, one that saw to 
it they would be treated fairly.161 
F. An Unregulated Trading Market in Private Placement Securities 
In addition, the Commission also appeared to be giving up its role in 
making sure that the capital markets were supplied with accurate 
information in the resale of private placement securities.  The Securities 
Act requires that, absent an exemption, there must first be an effective 
registration statement for the sale of every security.162  Section 4(1) of the 
Act,163 however, exempts the overwhelming number of secondary sales 
where there is no public offering occurring.164 
Securities Act Rule 144165 defines when such is the case.  As to 
securities taken in a private placement, it now provides generally that they 
 157. Section 18(b)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1)(A). 
 158. Section 18(b)(4)(D), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D). 
 159. Conference Report on National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, H.R. 
REP. NO. 104-864 (1996), Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,847 at 88, 650 (1996).  
 160. Revised Uniform Securities Act § 304. 
 161. See HAZEN, supra note 27, at 321, who comments, “[s]tate law merit regulation 
imposes a substantive scrutiny that goes further than the full disclosure approach of the 
federal laws.”  
Even after NISMA, leading courts have held that mere purported compliance with Rule 506 
will not be sufficient to preempt state registration.  Issuers must therefore fully comply with 
the requirements of the Rule 506 to be exempt from state registration.  Brown v. Earthboard 
Sports USA, Inc., 481 F.3d 901, 912 (6th Cir. 2007); Risdall v. Brown-Wilbert, Inc., 753 
N.W.2d 723, 727-30 (Minn. 2008), Blue Flame Energy Corp. v. Ohio Dep’t of Commerce, 
871 N.E.2d 1227, 1243-44 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006); Buist v. Time Domain Corp. 926 So. 2d 
290, 297 (Ala. 2005).  Contra Temple v. Gorman, 201 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1243-44 (S.D. Fla. 
2002). 
 162. Section 5(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1). 
 163. Section 4(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1). 
 164. As Professor Steinberg puts it, “[T]he Section 4(1) exemption permits individual 
investors to resell their securities without registration, provided such resales are viewed as 
‘transactions’ (rather than part of a ‘distribution’) and such persons are not deemed 
underwriters.”  STEINBERG, supra note 68, at 159. 
 165. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144. 
For a good general discussion of Rule 144, see STEINBERG, supra note 68, at 169-78. 
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may be freely sold after a holding period of just six months—if they are 
investments in a company which files Exchange Act reports166—and after a 
holding period of just one year in any event.167  Unregistered securities sold 
in a private placement may now be resold to anyone just one year after they 
have been initially purchased. 
The SEC expanded this approach in 1990, when it adopted Rule 
144A168 to allow the unregistered resale of private placement securities to 
“qualified institutional buyers” (QIBs).  These buyers are generally 
companies who own more than $100 million of non-affiliated securities.169  
If they are banks or savings and loan associations, they must have a net 
worth of at least $25 million.170  The net worth qualifications are also 
substantially reduced in certain situations for securities dealers.171 
This exemption has been used most often for the sale of securities by 
foreign companies in the U.S. capital markets.172  When they are sold to 
QIBs like pension and mutual funds, which are ultimately composed of 
ordinary investors, little real disclosure may be made of the operations of 
those off-shore entities.173  Nor do they have to become Exchange Act 
reporting companies even though the funds of a large number of American 
citizens may be indirectly committed to them.174 
VI. THE RISE OF HEDGE FUNDS 
A. Unregulated Investment Pools 
Much of the worrisome, contemporary turbulence in our capital 
markets can be attributed to the startling growth of large unregulated 
investment pools.  They include private equity funds—a more genteel name 
 166. Rule 144(d)(1)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(1)(i). 
 167. Rule 144(d)(1)(ii), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(1)(ii). 
 168. Resale of Restricted Securities, Securities Act Release No. 33-6862, Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (CCH) at 17,933 (Apr. 30, 1990). 
 169. Securities Act Rule 144A(a)(1)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(1)(i). 
 170. Securities Act Rule 144A(a)(1)(vi), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(1)(vi). 
 171. Securities Act Rule 144A(a)(1)(ii-iii), 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(1)(ii-iii). 
 172.  STEINBERG, supra note 68, at 182. 
 173. Congressional critics were alert to this possible prejudice to small savers at the 
inception of the rule.  See excerpts of a letter from Congressmen John D. Dingell and 
Edward J. Markey to SEC Chairman David Breeden in Robert A. Barron, Control and 
Restricted Securities:  Some Comments on SEC Rule 144A, 18 SEC. REG. L. J. 400 (1990). 
 174. Commissioner Karmel also observes that the market for 144A offerings has grown 
enormously during the nearly two decades of its existence, exceeding in 2006 the total 
capital raised on the New York and American Stock Exchanges and the NASDAQ 
combined.  See Karmel, supra note 62, at 684-85, 689. 
For a prescient early perspective on how Rule 144A would promote an institutional resale 
market, see Kellye Y. Testy, The Capital Markets in Transition:  A Response to New SEC 
Rule 144A, 66 IND. L.J. 233 (1990). 
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for groups that were called corporate raiders in the 1980s.175  Their goal is 
to buy up businesses from stockholders so that the private equity funds can 
restructure and resell the businesses in different forms.176  The most 
prominent in this category are hedge funds, a term that former SEC 
Chairman William Donaldson said was the “catch-all classification for 
many unregistered privately managed pools of capital.” 177 
Hedge funds have shaken up the market using aggressive trading 
strategies such as selling stocks short, buying complex derivative securities, 
or using complicated and proprietary mathematical formulas.178  
Misgivings about the deleterious impact that they could have on the overall 
economy first surfaced in 1998 with the Long Term Capital Growth fiasco.  
There, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan and others had to 
intervene to make sure the collapse of that fund would not imperil the 
entire finan 179
Such concerns have only grown in recent times as billions of dollars 
have flowed into these unregulated funds.  During the past fifteen years the 
number of hedge funds has increased from about five hundred to perhaps 
ten thousand.180  In 2006, they accounted for about half of the trading on 
the New York and London Stock Exchanges, and controlled about $2 
 175. See Daniel J. Morrissey, Safeguarding the Public Interest In Leveraged Buyouts, 69 
OR. L. REV. 47, 73-82 (1990) (explaining the questionable impact that private equity funds 
may have on communities and the economy in general). 
 176. According to one source, this constitutes an “unprecedented wave of deal making.”  
Dennis K. Berman et al., As Deal Barriers Fall, Takeover Bids Multiply, WALL ST. J., May 
8, 2007, at A1. 
 177. Jessica Natali, Trimming the Hedges is a Difficult Task:  The SEC’s Attempt to 
Regulate Hedge Funds Falls Short of Expectations, 15 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 113, 116 
(2006). 
In the same vein, one author called hedge funds “private and largely unregulated investment 
pools for the rich.”  ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED 24 (2000). 
The name “hedge fund” is at least partially derived from the financial flexibility that these 
entities have to diversify their investment strategies.  Unlike mutual funds, which are 
substantially regulated under the Investment Company Act, hedge funds can sell short and 
highly leverage themselves, as well as employ any one of approximately thirteen investment 
strategies.  Gerald T. Lins, Thomas P. Lemke, Kathryn L. Hoenig & Patricia Schoor Rube, 
Hedge Funds and Other Private Funds:  Regulation and Compliance § 1.1 (2004); see also 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds 
(2003), at 34-36 (discussing a variety of hedge fund investment strategies). 
Another commentator noted the following as hedge funds’ most salient characteristics:  
“privately organized, professionally administered, and not widely available to the public.”  
Sue Ann Mota, Hedge Funds:  Their Advisers Do Not Have to Register with the SEC, but 
More Information and Other Alternatives are Recommended, 67 LA. L. REV. 55, 55 (2006). 
 178. Karen Blumenthal, Grande Expectations:  A Year in the Life of Starbucks’ Stock 
3,109 (Crown Business 2007). 
 179. See Michael Lewis, How the Eggheads Cracked, N.Y. TIMES MAG. Jan. 24, 1999, at 
24; see also LOWENSTEIN, supra note 177. 
 180. John Cassidy, Hedge Clipping, THE NEW YORKER, July 2, 2007, at 28. 
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trillion in assets.181  Managers of three hedge funds that year earned more 
than $1 billion.182 
B. The Unregulated Nature of Hedge Funds 
Unlike banks, brokerage firms, and publicly-held companies, hedge 
funds are largely unregulated and their operations are not open to public 
scrutiny.183  Principally, Regulation D’s definition of an “accredited 
investor” makes it possible for these firms to sell their unregistered 
securities not just to institutions, but to individuals as well, so long as the 
securities meet the net worth or annual income provisions of the 
Regulation.184  In addition, hedge funds do not have to register or file 
periodic reports under the Exchange Act so long as they keep the number 
 181. David Cho, Hedge Funds Mystify Markets, Regulations, WASH. POST, July 4, 2007, 
at A1. 
 182. “In the jargon of Wall Street, hedge funds seek ‘alpha’ returns,” in part by 
borrowing heavily.  Managers charge their clients fees that can amount to 33% of the gains.  
Cassidy, supra note 180, at 28.  They structure their compensation arrangement so their 
income is only taxed at the capital gains rate of 15% instead of at the ordinary income rate 
of 35%.  See David Cay Johnston, Tax Loopholes Sweeten a Deal for Blackstone, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 13, 2007, at A1; Paul Krugman, Op-Ed. & Paul Krugman, An Unjustified 
Privilege, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2007, at A19. 
As such aggregation of capital has proliferated both in number and resources, those firms 
have correspondingly enjoyed access to the privileged information that power brings.  It 
appears, therefore, that their above-average returns may have more to do with the misuse of 
inside information than to investing acumen.  Jenny Anderson, As Lenders, Hedge Funds 
Draw Insider Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2006, at A1. 
As to the difficulty of prosecutors uncovering such illegal activity, the remarks of one 
fictional government law enforcement officials may be on point: 
We get better, they get better.  Especially with these new hedge funds and 
private-equity firms, we have no idea what’s going on.  If you’re cautious at all, 
we’re not going to catch you.  You’d have to be pathetic amateurs, like 
Bacanovic and Martha Stewart.  The big Wall Street guys, forget about it.  Most 
of them don’t even think insider trading is a crime.  In some countries, it isn’t. 
DOUG STUMPF, CONFESSIONS OF A WALL STREET SHOESHINE BOY 109 (Harper Collins 2007). 
 183. See generally, Sargon Daniel, Hedge Fund Registration:  Yesterday’s Regulatory 
Schemes For Today’s Investment Vehicles, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 247 (2007). 
As to their secrecy, one expert has said “[h]edge funds go to great lengths to maintain their 
mystique . . . managers rarely grant interviews and the mostly young analysts and traders 
who make up the funds’ staff sign confidentiality agreements barring them from discussing 
their work.”  Cassidy, supra note 180, at 28. 
Because of their secrecy, they have been described as “the mysterious rich uncle of the 
investment industry family; no one agrees on his age, occupation or history, but everyone 
knows he is related.”  Joseph Hellrung, Hedge Fund Regulation:  Investors are Knocking at 
the Door, but Can the SEC Clean House Before Everyone Rushes in?, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 
317, 319 (2005). 
 184. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
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of their equity holders under 500.185 
One would think, however, that hedge funds would come under the 
strict regulatory and disclosure requirements of the Investment Company 
Act of 1940 which, by its terms, covers any issuer that “is or holds itself 
out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the 
business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities.”186  If such were 
the case those companies would be prohibited from undertaking the 
“excessively risky”187 strategies usually entailed by leveraging.  In 
addition, their operational flexibility would be severely restricted because 
the Investment Company Act requires that a majority of such company’s 
shareholders consent to any of those changes.188 
Yet hedge funds are able to escape from such strictures by meeting 
one of two exemptions to the Act’s applicability, both of which are 
premised on the company not making, or planning to make, a registered 
public offering.  One allows exclusion if the firm’s securities are also held 
by less than 100 beneficial owners.189  The other covers companies whose 
securities are held by “qualified purchasers”; generally speaking those who 
have put at least $5 million into the firm or hold no less than $25 million in 
investments.190 
The avoidance of registration under the Securities Act therefore makes 
it possible, in large part, for hedge funds to avoid coming under the 
regulatory safeguards that should most fittingly apply to them as companies 
that deal in the securities of other firms.191  It also conveniently frees their 
The legal form which the typical hedge fund takes has been described in this fashion:  “To 
date, hedge funds have regularly been structured as limited partnerships or limited liability 
companies (LLCs), with fund investors being limited partners or LLC members, 
respectively, who acquire their interests in the fund in private placements that are exempt 
from the registration requirements of the federal securities laws.”  Parades, supra note 45, at 
982. 
 185. Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (2006). 
Accordingly, hedge funds typically limit their equity holders to a maximum of 499.  Daniel, 
supra note 183, at 260. 
 186. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A) (2004).  As Commissioner 
Karmel aptly puts it, “[f]unctionally, a hedge fund or private equity fund is no different from 
a mutual fund in that all three vehicles are pooled investment funds managed by an 
investment adviser.”  Karmel, supra note 62, at 691. 
 187. Daniel, supra note 183, at 264. 
 188. Investment Company Act, § 80a-13(a)(1) (2004). 
 189. Investment Company Act, § 80a-3(c)(1) (2004). 
As Daniel notes, “[i]f a beneficial owner owns less than 10% of the issuer’s securities and is 
an investment company under Section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7), then the beneficial owner will be 
treated as a single owner of the shares in the fund.  Importantly, the exception in Section 
3(c)(1) reflected Congress’s view that private investment companies with limited investors 
do not require registration.”  Daniel, supra note 183, at 262. 
 190. Investment Company Act, § 80a-3(c)(7)(A) (2004). 
 191. Not all commentators would agree with that characterization, ass one has written on 
the standard structure of hedge funds that avoids SEC regulation, “[t]his is not to suggest 
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managers to charge exorbitant fees usually taken in a percentage of the 
return192 which is generally unavailable in registered investment 
companies.193 
C. The SEC’s Attempt to Regulate Hedge Funds 
The SEC, in a 2003 report,194 listed a number of troubling issues 
involving the exponential growth of hedge funds that it believed could be 
cured by greater regulatory oversight.  As restated by one observer, those 
concerns fell into two broad categories:  “(i) the Commission’s lack of 
knowledge and inability to regulate or investigate the funds and (ii) the 
Commission’s inability to protect less sophisticated investors who buy into 
the funds not fully aware of the danger of default from the risks of hedge 
funds (both market and fraud).”195 
Most importantly, the Commission wanted information about the 
operation of hedge funds which was not available in any public source.  It 
also wanted to deter fraud by holding hedge fund managers subject to 
examination by the Commission’s staff.  Additionally, the SEC was 
troubled by what it called the “retail effect,” meaning the impact that the 
funds would have on ordinary investors through their aggregation of 
resources from pension funds, university endowments, and other 
institutional investors.196 
Acting on those concerns the Commission, by a 3-2 vote, modified 
Rule 203(b)(3)-2 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940197 to require 
hedge fund managers to register under its provisions.  Under that provision, 
advisers with fewer than 15 clients are exempt from that mandate.  The 
Commission’s modified rule would have “looked through” institutional 
entities that invested in hedge funds to see each of their members as a 
client.  In that regard, the SEC’s action differentiated hedge funds from 
other pooled investment vehicles such as private equity companies and 
that hedge funds skirt SEC regulation as a result of shenanigans where hedge fund managers 
strain to fit their funds within obscure legal loopholes.  Rather the design of federal 
securities laws itself has caused hedge funds to be lightly regulated.”  Paredes, supra note 
45, at 976. 
 192. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 193. For an adviser to receive a performance fee in a registered investment company, 
investors must have a net worth of $1.5 million or at least $750,000 under management by 
the adviser.  Investment Company Rule 205-3, 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3 (2006). 
 194. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 177. 
 195. Daniel, supra note 183, at 268. 
 196. Those are a distillation of factors cited by Paul F. Roye, Director of the SEC’s 
Division of Investment Management, for the Commission desire to take regulatory action 
over hedge funds.  Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 
Exchange Act, 69 Fed. Reg. 45172 (proposed July 28, 2004). 
 197. 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-2(a). 
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venture capital groups where the Commission did not deem its “look 
through” approach to be necessary.198 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, however, 
struck down the rule.199  It found that, although the general partners of 
hedge funds would meet the definition of “investment adviser” in the Act, 
they could still qualify for the fewer-than-fifteen-client exemption.  The 
Court held that the Commission, with its “look through” provision, had 
acted contrary to the legislative intent that investing entities, not their 
shareholders or members, were the advisers’ clients.200  The SEC chose not 
to appeal this decision.201 
 
D. Fall-out from the Sub-Prime Crisis 
The financial crisis resulting from the sub-prime lending meltdown 
has revealed just how precarious many hedge funds were.  In recent years 
bankers became increasingly adept at “slicing and dicing” their loans and 
selling them off to participating investors all over the world.  Subprime 
loans, in many ways, were the piece de resistance of that effort.202  A 
number of hedge funds borrowed heavily to stock their portfolios with 
those complex derivative securities that were collateralized by shaky 
mortgages.  They also invested in other poorly-secured debt obligations.203 
The ensuing debacle has claimed the prominent investment bank, Bear 
Stearns204 and has resulted in billions of dollars in losses for hedge funds 
 198. The Commission’s primary reason for that differentiation was that private equity 
and venture capital funds tend to make longer term investments.  It therefore made its “look 
through” rules applicable to funds where owners are permitted to redeem any portion of 
their interests within two years of purchase.  See Daniel, supra note 183, at 270-71. 
 199. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 200. Id. at 879. 
 201.  The Commission however proposed a new rule that would, among other things, 
prohibit all advisers of pooled investments from defrauding investors by means of false or 
misleading statements.  Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment 
Vehicles; Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, Exchange Act 
Release No. 33-8766, IA -2576, File No. 27-25-06 (Dec. 27, 2006); see also infra note 209-
15 and accompanying text. 
 202. Tett, supra note 5. 
 203. See Floyd Norris, Market Shock:  AAA Rating May Be Junk, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 
2007, at C1 (discussing how securities that were backed by sub-prime mortgages were given 
inflated credit ratings and then sold to hedge funds run by Bear Stearns). 
 204. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
These problems first came to public light in June, 2007 when Bear Stearns had to come up 
with $3.2 billion in loans to bail out two of its hedge funds that had speculated heavily in 
such collateralized debt obligations.  Kate Kelly & Serena Ng, Bear Stearns Bails Out Fund 
with Big Loan, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2007, at A1. 
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and the banks that loaned them funds to leverage their risky strategies.205  
The result is a virtual collapse of “financial faith,” at least in western 
circles.206  As one noted financial commentator put it, “if we have learned 
anything from this unrelenting credit mess, it is that greater disclosure is 
needed if investors are to regain their trust in the financial system.”207 
VII. THE SEC’S PROPOSED REVISIONS TO REGULATION D 
A. One Bright Spot for Investor Protection in Hedge Funds 
In the midst of this financial meltdown, the SEC surprisingly has 
proposed amendments to Regulation D that, for the most part, would 
further weaken the registration requirement.208  In one segment of those 
suggested changes, however, the Commission has shown admirable 
concerns for ordinary investors, particularly as to their special need for 
protection within investment vehicles such as hedge funds.209  In its release, 
the SEC noted the unique risks of those capital pools, particularly with 
regard to conflicts of interest, fee structures, and investment strategies.210 
Toward this end, the Commission reissued a renewed request for 
comment on its earlier proposal211 to create a new category of “accredited 
natural persons” who would be the only individuals allowed to invest in 
those funds.212  This new category would require that purchases of those 
securities not only meet the current net worth or income standard for 
individual accredited investors213 but also that those accredited investors 
have at least $2.5 million in “investments,” a term which, like its earlier use 
in the proposal defining “large accredited investors,” would exclude real 
estate held for personal use.214 
The SEC’s initial proposal was met with a spate of negative comments 
because it sought to curtail investor access to these unregistered investment 
 205. Cassel Bryan et al., Peloton Flew High, Fell Fast:  Winning Hedge Fund Lost on 
Bets as Credit Crunch Moved at Breakneck Speed, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2008, at C1; see 
also supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
 206. Tett, supra, note 5. 
 207. Gretchen Morgenson, A Bond Market, Starved for Sunshine, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 
2008, at BU1. 
 208. Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, Securities Act Release 
No. 33-8828, 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 230, and 239 (August 3, 2007). 
 209. Id. at 47-49. 
 210. Id. at 48. 
 211. Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; 
Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, Securities Act Release No. 33-
8766, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230 and 275 (Dec. 27, 2006). 
 212. SEC Release No. 33-8828, supra note 208, at 48. 
 213. See supra notes 127-28 and accompany text. 
 214. SEC Release No. 33-8828, supra note 208, at 48. 
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pools.215  Despite such criticism, the SEC is wisely attempting to provide 
some protection to individuals of limited means by restricting their access 
to these volatile, unregistered funds. 
B. A Generally Ill-Advised Initiative 
For the most part, however, the SEC’s proposed changes are not in 
line with its mission to protect investors and safeguard the integrity of our 
capital markets.  The Commission presents these amendments as a further 
attempt to assist small business in its capital formation,216 but the SEC’s 
real reasons may be more strategic. 
As Commissioner Karmel has suggested, the Commission is perhaps 
giving ground again on registration’s coverage to preserve its 
“jurisdictional grip and ideological purity with respect to the regulation of 
initial public offerings.”217  In other words, to forestall the outright repeal 
of the registration requirement by deregulatory zealots, the Commission 
seems to be trying to appease them by allowing its mini-death by a 
thousand cuts. 
For whatever reason, the SEC’s initiative here is wrong-headed.  Not 
only is it in derogation of the Commission’s mission to protect investors 
from fraud when studies show that such harmful activity is more rampant 
than ever,218 it would also lessen the disclosure needed by the capital 
market when current events have demonstrated that just the opposite 
approach is called for.219 
C. The Proposed Changes 
The Commission’s release puts forth three major amendments to 
Regulation D for consideration.  Most significantly it would create another 
alternative category of accredited investors that would consist of 
individuals with as little as $750,000 in “investment owned funds.”220  
Unlike the current Rule 501(a)(5) and (6) definitions of accredited 
investors that are based respectively on a person’s net worth and income,221 
this alternative test would not include real estate held for personal 
purposes.222 
Yet with the substantial increase in stock value over the years, many 
 215. Id. at 49. 
 216. Id. at 5. 
 217. Karmel, supra note 62, at 681. 
 218. See infra notes 233-35 and accompany text. 
 219. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
 220. SEC Release No. 33-8828, supra note 208, at 29-31. 
 221. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text. 
 222. SEC Release No. 33-8828, supra note 208, at 34-35. 
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mature individuals are now holding such accumulation of assets.  This is 
particularly a result of the decline of defined benefit pension plans and the 
tax law’s concomitant encouragement to workers to develop their own 
retirement funds.223  By that fact alone, however, those individuals can 
hardly be deemed sophisticated enough to protect their financial interests 
on their own.  On the contrary, without registration, they can easily fall 
prey to the blandishments of unscrupulous promoters and smooth con men, 
as the SEC has long feared.224 
In addition, the SEC is proposing to define a new class of “large 
accredited investors” that would generally consist of individuals with more 
than $2.5 million in total assets or annual incomes in excess of $400,000.225  
Securities salesmen could make pitches to this new class of investors in 
unregistered offerings through advertising or general solicitations.  Such 
techniques, however, seem obviously incompatible with the exemption for 
“non-public” offerings.226  Therefore, the Commission has traditionally 
forbidden these techniques out of an appropriate concern that a wide range 
of investors in those situations might be lured into unsafe or unduly 
speculative ventures.227 
The SEC has also announced that it is considering relaxing its 
“integration” doctrine that prohibits issuers of unregistered securities from 
making such offerings in serial fashion to finance the same business.228  
The Commission has historically believed that condoning such activity 
would artificially divide one total money-raising venture and thus abuse the 
carefully considered exemptions from registration.229 
The SEC’s proposal, however, would shorten the current safe harbor 
 223. The most popular of these tax deferred arrangements is Section 401(k) of the 
Internal Revenue Code, I.R.C. § 401(k) (2008). 
 224. See Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Investor Advocacy and Education, 
http://www.sec.gov/investor.shtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2008) (listing the SEC’s extensive 
publications warning investors of investment schemes); see also Pres Release, Sec. and 
Exch. Comm’n, SEC to Convene Summit to Combat Investment Fraud Against Senior 
Citizens Securities Exchange Commission, Release No. 2007-160 (Aug. 7, 2007) available 
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-160.htm (announcing the SEC’s second 
annual senior summit to protect older Americans from investment fraud). 
 225. SEC Release No. 33-8828, supra note 208, at 9-17. 
 226. Section 4(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2). 
 227. Regulation D, Securities Act Rule 502(c), Rules Governing the limited Offer and 
Sale of Securities Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, (codified as 
amended at 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c)). 
 228. SEC Release No. 33-8828, supra note 208, at 57-61. 
 229. Securities Act Release No. 33-4522 (1962).  For the author’s views on integration, 
see Daniel J. Morrissey, Integration of Securities Offerings—The ABA’s “Indiscreet” 
Proposal, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 41 (1984).  Further strengthening this doctrine, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court has recently affirmed that two unregistered offerings may be integrated even 
when there are no sales in the second one.  Risdall v. Brown-Wilbert, 753 N.W.2d 723, 731-
34 (2008). 
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that allows such offerings if they are spaced at least six months apart and 
permit them if they are made just 90 days from each other.230  A leading 
state administrator, however, has wisely commented that such a change is 
“unwarranted and dangerous”231 for a number of reasons aptly summed up 
by his view that “90 days will not be an adequate period to make a series of 
exempt offerings . . . truly separate and distinct from each other.”232 
D. Regulation D and Investor Fraud 
The Commission’s proposal to allow unregistered offerings to those 
with just $750,000 of investment income is in stark derogation of the 
SEC’s own findings about the pervasive nature of “elder fraud.”  On its 
website, the Commission states that 5 million senior citizens--an 
astounding number--are victims of such practices every year.233  A study by 
the NASD sought to understand why older consumers with “nest-eggs” of 
accumulated assets are frequently easy prey for these schemes.234  The 
study found that those persons have often recently experienced negative 
events in their lives and are susceptible to the cunning of criminals who 
capitalize on the senior citizens’ psychological profiles.235 
A letter of comment to the SEC well encapsulated the dangers of the 
Commission’s proposed expansion of its exemptions to the registration 
requirements, particularly as they apply to older investors.  The author 
identified himself as a law student and wrote to the Commission, “Your 
proposed (as well as current) definition would include my 90 year old 
grandmother as an accredited investor (believe me she has no expertise in 
this field) as well as a whole host of the elderly.”236  He also mentioned a 
relative of his who is currently a major league baseball player who “doesn’t 
know the first thing about finance, yet he’d meet the SEC’s proposed 
definition of not only accredited, but large accredited investor.”237 
The dangers to ordinary investors here from unregistered offerings 
made to accredited investors have also been made worse by inflation.  
 230. SEC Release No. 33-8828, supra at 57-61. 
 231. Letter from Bryan J. Lantagne, Director, Massachusetts Securities Division to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Oct. 12, 2007) at p. 8 (commenting on Release Nos. 
33-8828 and IC-27922). 
 232. Id. 
 233. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Investor Advocacy and Education, 
http://www.sec.gov/investor.shtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2008). 
 234. NASD Investor Education Foundation, Investor Fraud Study Final Report (May 12, 
2006). 
 235. Id. at 5. 
 236. Letter from David J. Lazarovic to the Securities and Exchange Commission (Aug. 
17, 2007). 
 237. Id. 
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Professor Marc Steinberg found that someone who qualified as an 
accredited investor in 2000 by virtue of having a net worth of $1 million238 
would only have had net assets of $600,000 in 1982 and thus would not 
have met the wealth test that Regulation D contemplated at its inception.  
Likewise, someone who so qualified because of $200,000 annual income239 
in 2000 would only have had $120,000 in earnings in 1982, also failing to 
satisfy the accredited investor standard for income as it was originally 
set.240 
In addition, a big rise in the percentage of accredited investors may 
also be a result of the substantial appreciation in housing valuations during 
the last 25 years, because that figure can be included in an individual’s net 
worth under Rule 501(5).241  Reflecting those factors, the Commission 
proposal acknowledges that in 1982, when Regulation D was adopted, only 
1.87% of U.S. households qualified for accredited investor status, 
compared with 8.47% today.242  Yet the SEC has there indicated it will not 
consider adjusting the net worth or annual income qualifications for 
accredited investor status until 2012, and even then it will only use 2006 as 
its baseline.243 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
In the depths of this country’s worst economic crisis, lawmakers found 
a way to save a financial system that offered promise as well as peril.  They 
accomplished this by requiring that those who seek other peoples’ money 
by offering the possibility of profit be fully honest about the risks as well as 
the potential rewards of those ventures.  The mechanism for this mandated 
disclosure is the registration statement, a tool that has underwritten the 
integrity of our capital markets for three-quarters of a century. 
This registration requirement should not be weakened, but rather made 
more forceful in its application.  Investor protection demands this and the 
recent gyrations of our financial system have shown the misfortune that can 
befall capital markets when there is no governmental apparatus to 
guarantee full and forthright disclosure to potential investors.  As this 
Article has discussed, the SEC has constantly been sensitive to reviewing 
the required content of registration statements to make them “user-
friendly.”  At the same time, it has reformed its regulations governing 
 238. Securities Act Rule 501(5), 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(5). 
 239. Securities Act Rule 501(6), 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(6). 
 240. Marc Steinberg, The “Accredited” Individual Purchaser Under Regulation D:  
Time to Up the Ante, 20 SEC. REG. L.J. 93 (2001). 
 241. See Marc Steinberg, Letter to Securities and Exchange Commission, File No. 27-18-
07, at 2. 
 242. SEC Release No. 33-8828, supra note 208, at 15. 
 243. Id. at 42-43. 
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issuers’ conduct in the registration process to make sure that they do not 
unreasonably inhibit capital formation. 
However, with the adoption of Regulation D 25 years ago, the 
Commission began whittling away at the viability of the registration 
statement by expanding the exemptions to its applicability.  The SEC’s 
current proposals to widen them even further are particularly ill-considered 
in light of the crisis of confidence that the hedge fund/sub-prime debacle 
has brought to our financial system.  If our economy is to thrive, the 
registration requirement must maintain its vigor.  Only then, with the 
legitimate hope of a fair return, will investors have the confidence to 
furnish capital to needy enterprises. 
